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AbStRACt
This chapter argues that there is conflict between the requirements laid 
down by the regimes of ethical regulation that have been introduced in 
many countries over the past few decades and what is required if social 
research is to be done well, not least in ethical terms. The reasons for the 
rise of ethical regulation are outlined along with the criticisms that have 
been made of it by social scientists. One aspect of this criticism has been an 
emphasis on the necessarily situational character of ethical judgement, the 
potential conflicts amongst values, and the ways in which ethical considera-
tions are entwined with methodological and prudential ones. These points 
have often been formulated via the concept of phrónēsis (wise judgement). 
The meaning of this is outlined as well as how the need for such judgement 
conflicts with the assumptions built into the operation of ethical regula-
tion. It is suggested that these assumptions, as embedded in many official 
statements, amount to a form of moralism that is counterproductive if good 
research that is ethically acceptable is to be encouraged. It is argued that 
ethics committees should not exercise control over what research is done 
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but ought rather to serve as forums in which researchers are forced to justify 
the design of proposed research studies, and to address any ethical issues 
arising from research that they have already carried out.
Keywords: Phrónēsis; virtue ethics; social research; research ethics
INtRoduCtIoN
this chapter focusses on the sharp tension between the ‘creep’ of ethical 
regulation from the fields of medicine and psychology across the whole of 
social science (haggerty, 2004) and the practical requirements of doing social 
research in ways that are ethically satisfactory. what is meant by ‘ethical 
regulation’ here is the operation of ethics committees, located in universi-
ties and other organisations, that decide whether or not particular research 
projects can go ahead, and on what terms. in the united Kingdom, and some 
other countries, this is a relatively new process, becoming established over the 
past 20 years. By contrast, in the united States, institutional review Boards 
(irBs) have been in operation for several decades.
in part, the rise of ethical regulation reflects a now dominant feature of 
much public sector management: the drive for so-called ‘transparent account-
ability’ which requires members of professions continually to demonstrate that 
what they do is effective and efficient (diefenbach, 2009; Pollitt, 1990; Power, 
1997). this has been closely associated with a collapse in public trust of pro-
fessionals, exacerbated by the fact that we cannot avoid reliance on strangers 
in an increasingly globalised world, leading to the idea that some procedural 
substitute for personal trust is required. equally important, perhaps, has been 
increased cynicism, generated by a culture that has been strongly shaped by 
the falsehoods of advertisers and publicity agents, and the spin of politicians.
So, ethical regulation of social research is, to some degree, just one fur-
ther example of the requirement that specialised occupational activities be 
subject to a mode of explicit procedural accountability. however, another 
major driver behind the rise of ethical regulation of social research seems to 
have been a concern on the part of funding bodies, in the united Kingdom 
principally the economic and Social research council, as well as universi-
ties, that they could be open to legal prosecution and compensation claims 
should any research they fund, or researchers they employ, be deemed to have 
caused harm (dingwall, 2008; hedgecoe, 2016; van den hoonaard, 2011). 
it is at least partly to defend themselves against this perceived threat, in an 
increasingly litigious society, that they have turned to the establishment of 
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ethics committees to vet research proposals, viewing these as offering some 
legal defence and allowing them to deflect blame onto individual researchers 
where there has been deviation from laid down procedures.1
as already noted, moves towards ethical regulation of research initially 
arose in the context of medical and psychological research, including that 
involving animals, where, as a result of the growth of medical complaints, and 
of campaigns by animal rights activists, there was perceived to be an increas-
ingly severe risk of legal challenge. however, extension of the remit of ethics 
committees across most social research has prompted considerable criticism: 
many social researchers argue that the new regulatory procedures have intro-
duced significant barriers into the research process, as well as delays. Some 
have also insisted that these procedures are unnecessary, counterproductive (in 
the sense that, in practice, they are likely to increase the chances of unethical 
practice), and are themselves unethical, being an infringement of the academic 
freedom that is essential if  sound research is to be pursued (see, for example, 
dingwall, 2006; feeley, 2007a; hamburger, 2007; hammersley, 2009; Katz, 
2007; Schrag, 2010; Shweder, 2006; traianou, 2015; van den hoonaard, 2011). 
discussing the uS context, Zywicki (2007, p. 866) writes the following:
virtually all commentators who have studied the irB system as it currently operates […] 
believe that the costs of the system […] vastly exceed the benefits, especially when the oppor-
tunity cost of researchers’ and irB panellists’ time is taken into account. there is little hard 
evidence that irBs, as they are currently composed [of], create more than trivial amounts of 
public value in terms of reducing the risk of dangerous or unethical research, or that less bur-
densome alternatives could not perform the same functions more efficiently. […] By contrast, 
there are several well-known examples of irB lapses that permitted dangerous research to 
occur, notwithstanding compliance with the onerous irB process. at the same time, there are 
many examples of innocent researchers caught in the Kafkaesque world of irB procedures.
Meanwhile, coe (2007, p. 724) declares that ‘the irB movement began with 
a noble purpose but has degenerated into a tyranny that must be overthrown’.
one component of this criticism has been sometimes an emphasis on the 
essential role of phrónēsis (wise judgement) in social research, as in other 
professional activities (see dunne, 1997). it has been argued that, because 
this is necessary if  research is to be pursued well, the sort of transparency 
demanded by ethical regulation is impossible. More than this, there is sig-
nificant potential for current attempts to regulate the ethics of research to 
have undesirable effects on the moral character of researchers, leading them 
to become primarily concerned with whether or not they are compliant with 
established rules or procedures rather than with making good ethical and 
methodological judgements. and these two concerns will often not be com-
patible. whatever the quality of deliberation that takes place within an ethics 
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committee, the fact that researchers are virtually forced to comply with its 
decisions will short-circuit any process of phrónēsis on their part – at least in 
the initial planning stage of the research, and perhaps later as well.
thE CoNCEPt of PhRÓNēSIS
aristotle argued that governance – from state decision-making to the running 
of a household – relies on phrónēsis. the meaning of this Greek word can, to 
some degree, be rendered in english by the concept of skill, especially since we 
talk of social as well as of physical skills. Skills are learned via lengthy peri-
ods of experience and practice, perhaps under the guidance of someone who 
already has them, this perhaps being accompanied by reflection on past experi-
ence that is directed towards facilitating improved performance in the future. 
thus, skill does not amount to following a set of rules, even though ‘rules of 
thumb’ can be used to facilitate and refine skilful practice (see dreyfus, 2004; 
dreyfus & dreyfus, 1986; see also eraut, 1994). however, the notion of skill 
omits an important element from the meaning given to the term ‘phrónēsis’ 
by aristotle: it is not just a matter of skill but also of virtue (see hammersley, 
2018; Macfarlane, 2009; Pring, 2001). what aristotle means by an activity 
being done well is not just that actions are effective in achieving a goal but also 
that they are performed in ways that are good in a broader sense than this: that 
they exemplify and respect all human ideals. furthermore, not the least part of 
this is that how the activity is performed must be good for the person engaged 
in it: it must form part of a good life for that person. aristotle argues that only 
those who act in ways that contribute to a good life for themselves will be act-
ing ethically. indeed, this is in large part what the term ‘ethical’ means for him.
how far can this notion of phrónēsis be applied to the task of carrying 
out social research, and to research ethics specifically? we can think of human 
activities as being ranged along a dimension, or set of dimensions, of increas-
ing complexity. it seems likely that the more complex the activity, the greater 
the need for phrónēsis. there are various aspects of this complexity, such as the 
following:
1.  interpretation may be required regarding what would count as achieving 
the goal(s) of the activity, and about what are the proper constraints oper-
ating on its pursuit.
2.  conflicting goals or concerns may need to be taken into account.
3.  the situations faced may not conform to standard types in which standard 
‘treatments’ can be applied.
aQ3
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Pursuit of activities at one end of this spectrum can be reduced to specific 
procedures or rules, at least to some degree. however, towards the other end, 
it becomes increasingly difficult to do this, and doing social research falls into 
this category.
Some kinds of research, especially those involving qualitative methods, 
display these kinds of complexity in the sharpest form. this is because they 
require the collection of unstructured data through open-ended interviews, 
or participant observation in ‘natural’ settings over which the researcher has 
little control. in the latter case, access may need to be negotiated if  the rel-
evant settings are to be observed, and interpersonal relations will need to be 
established and maintained with participants in those settings. what this will 
entail, and what problems may arise, cannot be anticipated with much accu-
racy; and judgements about what it is best to do will have to take account 
of particular events in the settings and of the evolving relationships of the 
researcher with gatekeepers and participants. Both methodological and ethi-
cal considerations are involved here. indeed, while these two sorts of issues 
are analytically distinct, in practice these are closely intertwined: when 
researchers make decisions in the field they must take account of both these 
dimensions and of how they relate to one another, as well as of prudential 
issues such as those relating to their own safety.
in light of this, it should be clear that there are many respects in which the 
concept of phrónēsis captures important features of what is involved in social 
research. above all, there is an unavoidable need for situational judgement: 
decisions have to be tailored to particular situations, involving judgements 
about what is more and what is less important in the circumstances, and there-
fore what should be foregrounded and what backgrounded (see ebrahim, 
2010; flewitt, 2005; Simons & usher, 2000). equally necessary are the judge-
ments about the likelihood of various outcomes, of what is likely to lead to 
success, of the probable extent of benefits, or the risks and likely severity of 
harms. in other words, judgements have to be made about what is proportion-
ate and appropriate in all these respects, given the particular situations faced. 
Moreover, as already noted, these situations do not come in standard forms, 
nor are ethical issues – if  what is meant by this phrase is ‘what is proper in 
dealing with other people’ – the only relevant considerations.
thE CoNfLICt wIth EthICAL REGuLAtIoN
there are two assumptions built into the process of ethical regulation that 
are at odds with the idea that researchers must exercise phrónēsis. first, it 
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assumes that ethical issues can, and should, be identified at the beginning of 
the research process, with specific strategies for responding to them identi-
fied. ethics committees will usually only give the green light to a project if  
potential ethical (and indeed methodological) problems, along with ways of 
dealing with them, have been spelt out in the initial proposal. in other words, 
an ethical and methodological template must be set up at the beginning, and 
it is expected that this will be followed in the research process itself.
however, it should be clear from what has been said above, and from even 
the most superficial experience of the research process, that not all problems 
can be anticipated, that some that are anticipated do not arise, and that even 
when problems have been anticipated they will often take forms that require 
new thinking about how to handle them in the specific circumstances in which 
they occur. as already noted, this is especially true in the case of qualitative 
inquiry, where research does not and cannot involve formulating a research 
design, and then simply implementing it. Participant observation in natural 
settings requires continual negotiation of access to data, and is therefore sub-
ject to various contingencies, over many of which the researcher has little con-
trol. even in the case of interviews, these are usually relatively unstructured 
in character, and often carried out in settings that are not controlled by the 
researcher. all these features make it difficult to anticipate what will happen 
at various stages of the research process and to plan in any detail how ethical 
issues will be dealt with. to one degree or another, this applies to the practice 
of all forms of social research as opposed to textbook accounts of them.
the second feature of ethical regulation which is at odds with the practical 
nature of research, and its reliance on phrónēsis, is the assumption that what 
is and is not the ‘best practice’ can be made fully explicit. this is not possible 
because, like other professional activities, research necessarily depends upon 
the personal capacity to make decisions in which a variety of relevant consid-
erations must be weighed against one another and given appropriate interpreta-
tions and priority in particular circumstances. the grounds for these decisions 
cannot be made fully explicit in ways that would be accessible to someone with 
little experience of the kind of research involved and/or of the situation in 
which it was carried out. there is a parallel here with the inability of a doctor to 
explain in ‘transparent’ terms how she judges what particular sets of symptoms 
indicate, or of a social worker to make explicit why she ‘knows’ that something 
is wrong during a family visit even when there are no obvious signs. it is not 
that these matters are beyond all expression, but rather that no formulation can 
make their full significance clear to the lay person (see Montgomery, 2006).
the key problem here is that members of ethics committees, not just ‘lay 
members’ but most members, will not have this capacity because they do not 
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have the relevant background knowledge and experience: they will not always 
have had practical experience with the methods being proposed in a particular 
study, and they are even less likely to have detailed substantive knowledge of 
the setting(s) in which the research will be carried out. as a result, most of them 
would not be well placed even to judge retrospective accounts of decisions that 
had been made in a piece of research. Yet, as already noted, in fact they are 
being asked to make a judgement prospectively on the basis of a researcher’s 
and their own anticipations of what problems might arise and how these could 
best be dealt with. i suggest that it is near impossible to do this well with any 
reliability. this is purportedly done on the basis of various codes and proce-
dural statements that are taken properly to govern all ethical judgements about 
research practice. these amount to an ‘abridgement of the contingencies and 
vicissitudes of practice that aspires to be but can never succeed in becoming an 
authoritative, prescriptive guide for practice’ (Gray, 2009, pp. 78–79).2
Moreover, very often, ‘best practice’ amounts to what has been called mor-
alism: ‘the vice of overdoing morality’ (coady, 2005, p. 101; hammersley 
& traianou, 2012, conclusion).3 in the case of ethical regulation, moralism 
refers to the requirement that researchers adhere to ‘high’, perhaps even to 
‘the highest’, ethical standards, these being specified in terms of abstract 
principles whose implications for particular cases are regarded as closely 
determined in character – in effect, they amount to injunctions. appeal to 
high, or even the highest, ethical standards is routine in the rhetoric around 
ethical regulation. for example, the uK research integrity office (uKrio, 
2009, p. 14) states that ‘we promote integrity and high ethical standards,’ and 
recently produced a document which places emphasis on the ‘training and 
development’ of researchers in order to ensure that they meet the ‘highest 
standards’ of ‘research conduct’.4 this document is entirely about compli-
ance, with no hint that there could be problems or disagreements about what 
would and would not be ethical, or what would be justifiable. for instance, 
one concrete requirement is that consent be obtained from research partici-
pants. But as i have argued elsewhere, written consent is not always desir-
able (see hammersley & traianou, 2012, chapter 4), and in the context of 
covert research it is impossible. amongst social science researchers, there has 
been much debate around whether covert research is ever justified and, if  so, 
under what conditions (Bulmer, 1982; herrera, 1999; leo, 1995). Some com-
mentators argue that it is virtually never legitimate (Bok, 1978; Shils, 1956; 
warwick, 1982), while others insist that covert research is an acceptable and 
necessary strategy in particular research settings (calvey, 2000, 2008, 2017; 
douglas, 1976; homan, 1980). these discussions have identified a range of 
considerations that need to be taken into account in making judgements 
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about this issue. the discourse of ethical regulation makes it almost impos-
sible for covert research to be pursued. in my view, however, rather than being 
formulated either as a general prohibition or even as a globally permissive 
statement, any judgement about whether or not covert research is legitimate 
must be made in relation to specific cases. this is because covertness can vary 
significantly, as too can conditions in the field that are relevant to making a 
judgement about its legitimacy.
in statements like those from uKrio (2009), it is apparently assumed 
that we cannot be ‘too ethical’, and that social research involves a high risk 
of severe ethical dangers for the people studied so that rigorous precautions 
must be taken to avoid these. Yet, since there are often conflicting principles, 
it is by no means clear what would or would not be ethical, or more rather 
than less ethical, in some cases. furthermore, there is very often a tension 
between ethical considerations relating to the people being studied and the 
methodological requirements of the research, so that some sort of trade-off  
is required between the two. once again, this must necessarily be done in a 
way that takes account of the distinctive features of the particular situation 
faced. for reasons already explained, this is not the sort of judgement that 
ethics committees can make.
it is also necessary to recognise that in the world in which researchers must 
operate, the other parties with whom they have to deal may well be commit-
ted to ideals and interests that are at odds with the requirements of social 
research in one respect or another. one of the problems with the kind of 
moralism being criticised here is that it is premised on an unrealistic view of 
human nature and society. conflicting ideals and interests, and struggles over 
these, are endemic in social life; and, as a result, the use of coercion, manipu-
lation and deception is widespread. Given this, moralism is not a viable basis 
for carrying out any activity, including qualitative inquiry (douglas, 1976; 
duster, Matza, & wellman, 1979; littrell, 1993). if  researchers are to get 
their work done in the world as it is and produce reliable knowledge, they will 
often have to engage in actions that fall short of ‘the highest standards’.
in short, what can reasonably be expected of social researchers is not 
adherence to the highest standards but rather that their behavior is acceptable 
in terms of practical values, taking account of the constraints operating in the 
situations concerned. it is also important to remember that social scientists 
are members of a profession operating within societies and that all they can 
distinctively aspire to is a high commitment to a specific goal and to the val-
ues associated with this, not some general ethical superiority. Perhaps it is 
necessary to emphasise that this does not amount to a recommendation of 
expediency, even less to the conclusion that ‘anything goes’. in fact, adopting 
Ethical Regulation of Social Research Versus Phrónēsis Cultivation 171
a more realistic conception of what research ethics entails ought to lead to 
more careful and realistic judgements about what can and should be done in 
the field.
interestingly, all this suggests a slightly different approach to the notion of 
phrónēsis from that characteristic of aristotle, one that takes in Machiavelli’s 
rather different conception of ‘virtue’. contrary to what is sometimes 
assumed, Machiavelli did not propose that rulers and other political agents 
should pursue evil ends. rather, he argued that they will often have to use 
means that are regarded as morally questionable, such as deception, and even 
sometimes those that are abhorrent, such as war, in order to pursue effectively 
ends that are good. according to Strauss (1987, p. 84), Machiavelli was the 
first of the early modern political philosophers whose ethical thinking starts 
not from ‘how people ought to live’, in the manner of the ancients but rather 
from ‘how people actually live’. in Max weber’s terms, Machiavelli rejected 
an ‘ethics of ultimate ends’ in favor of an ‘ethic of responsibility’ (see Bruun, 
2007, pp. 250–259). it seems to me that there is scope for applying this argu-
ment in the context of research (hammersley & traianou, 2011). however, 
the contrast between this Machiavellian approach and the aristotelian notion 
of phrónēsis should not be exaggerated: in both cases the emphasis is on the 
need to develop wise and skilful judgement in dealing, in the best way possi-
ble, with the contingencies that arise, taking account of all the considerations 
that are relevant, including those that conflict with one another. this is not 
a matter of the end justifying the use of any means but rather that both ends 
and means must be ranked in terms of desirability (on various grounds), with 
phrónēsis being deployed to ‘weigh’ the relative desirability of achieving a 
particular end against the use of means of varying degrees of likely effective-
ness and desirability.
CoNCLuSIoN
the demand for transparent accountability is understandable. there are gen-
uine, and potentially serious, ethical dangers involved in the pursuit of some 
kinds of research; and, where these arise, regulation will certainly be neces-
sary. More generally, the second half  of the twentieth century witnessed a 
gradual erosion of public trust in claims made by professionals to be devoted 
solely to carrying out their tasks well, and thereby in their capacity to reg-
ulate themselves. indeed, some sociologists and economists came to view 
professionalism as an ideology designed to enable occupations to increase 
their power over clients, over other occupations, and in relation to other 
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organisations, including nation-states (see, for example, larson, 1977). in 
this context, it might be argued that use of the concept of phrónēsis amounts 
to little more than an appeal to professional mystique, allowing bias in the 
service of self-interest.
Moreover, in the context of large, complex, and, to a large degree, glo-
balised societies, we are forced to rely on anonymous others, where there can 
be no personal trust. while professional status and expertise at one time pro-
vided a substitute for this, in a world where status hierarchies are increasingly 
under challenge, and where trust has been eroded by fraudulent advertising 
and political spin, this kind of trust is undercut. as a result, there have been 
increasing demands for ‘transparent accountability’, in other words, the basis 
for professional judgements be made explicit so as to be open to judgement 
by others. this was, of course, a central theme in the evidence-based prac-
tice movement (wieringa, engebretsen, heggen, & Greenhalgh, 2017). while 
such accountability may not be possible, the concerns lying behind the call for 
this are by no means all misguided, some are genuine.
at the same time, we must not allow this to blind us to the problems 
involved in doing research well, and the necessary reliance of this on situ-
ational judgements, albeit guided by principles. i have spelt out the implica-
tions of this for research ethics. there is no form of transparency that will 
allow others to see, or to be completely assured, that what is being done by 
professionals, including researchers, conforms to the ‘best practice’, in the 
sense of what it would be best to do in the specific circumstances faced. and 
pretending that there is some means of doing this, by enforcing procedures 
relying on this assumption, for instance, in the form of ethical regulation, 
damages the practice involved. any attempt to deal with the ethical dangers 
associated with research must be proportionate, and should respect the limits 
of what is possible – rather than simply assuming that transparent account-
ability must be achievable, and that it will eliminate all uncertainty and risk. 
the risks associated with most social research are very different from, and 
arguably less severe than, those involved in testing medical treatments, which 
is where the pressure for ethical regulation originally arose. furthermore, 
non-experimental research, and especially that involving the collection of 
unstructured data in the field, is much less open to prospective, procedural 
control than experimental work. indeed, attempts to achieve this will almost 
always be counterproductive.5
it is also worth emphasising that researchers have never been free to do as 
they wish, contrary to what often seems to be assumed about the past. Prior 
to the spread of ethical regulation, they nevertheless operated in situations 
where legal rules applied; where other agents, notably gatekeepers but also 
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sometimes research participants, had considerable power over the research 
process; and where there was always the prospect that colleagues would bring 
what they regarded as unethical behaviour to public attention, resulting in 
reputational damage for the researcher concerned, at the very least.6 any jus-
tification put forward for ethical regulation needs to demonstrate that these 
curbs were, and are, inadequate in the case of social research. it also needs 
to show that ethical regulation works in minimising, or at least reducing, 
unethical behaviour on the part of researchers. Yet, there is little evidence 
that it does; indeed, determining this is fraught with difficulties because of 
the variable judgements that can be made about what is and is not ethical. 
these judgements are rarely a matter of the straightforward application of 
a single principle, and as a result there is considerable scope for reasonable 
disagreement about what would and would not be ethical. this is precisely 
why phrónēsis is required, and that’s why the attempt to achieve ‘transpar-
ency’ is unrealistic, while attempts to achieve it will very often have damaging 
consequences.7
it is perhaps necessary to emphasise that even if  research necessarily 
depends upon phrónēsis, this does not rule out the desirability of guidelines, 
such as the ‘codes’ developed by professional associations. however, these 
must recognise that ethical considerations – specifically those relating to how 
researchers deal with the people they study – are multiple and potentially in 
conflict, and that they are not the only considerations that must be taken into 
account in doing research. above all, codes must acknowledge that research-
ers have an obligation to pursue worthwhile knowledge effectively, and in a 
way that is prudent, for instance, keeping any risk of serious harm to them-
selves below an acceptable threshold. furthermore, the pressure built into the 
specification of guidelines towards treating these as rules that should govern 
research activity must be resisted. Yet, this is precisely the tendency that ethi-
cal regulation institutionalises.
the role of phrónēsis does not eliminate all the functions of ethics com-
mittees, but they should no longer be regulatory bodies determining whether 
or not research projects can go ahead. instead, they ought to be forums in 
which researchers are required to outline and defend their research proposals, 
or to defend research they have already carried out where this has generated 
ethical concerns.8 in this way ethics committees could play an important role 
in facilitating the development of phrónēsis on the part of researchers, since 
they would force greater attention to methodological and ethical issues, and 
expose individual researchers to diverse views about these. at present, the 
regulatory function of ethics committees seriously inhibits this process, and 
thereby damages social research.
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NotES
1. even though it is external funding bodies that instituted the requirement of ethi-
cal approval, most universities require almost all social research to go through an eth-
ics committee, even that which is not externally funded, or not funded by an external 
agency that requires a research proposal to be approved by an ethics committee.
2. Gray is here discussing philosopher oakeshott’s (1962) critique of what he labels 
“rationalism.”
3. there is a parallel between moralism and the religious enthusiasm that locke 
(1975, chapter 19) and others objected to in the seventeenth century as part of their 
defence of political liberalism.
4. See http://ukrio.org/wp-content/uploads/uKrio-code-of-Practice-for-research.
pdf. accessed on June 23, 2017.
5. in addition, Stark (2011, p. 2, and passim) has shown that in medicine ethical 
regulation “has served to enable research as much as to restrict it,” including some that 
many would regard as unethical.
6. for examples of cases where colleagues have called one another to account in the 
context of social research, see hammersley and traianou (2012, chapter 1).
7. the case of medical research, and indeed any experimental research that involves 
treatments that carry with them substantial risks of harm, as well as potential ben-
efit, is different from that of most social research. here the potential dangers of ethi-
cal regulation may be outweighed by the risks carried by the research. however, it is 
important to note that even here regulation cannot deliver transparent accountability, 
nor does it necessarily prevent harm. of course, ethical regulation can have beneficial 
consequences in terms of prompting researchers to take more account of ethical con-
siderations, to recognise problems that they had overlooked, etc. however, it seems 
likely that these benefits could be gained in other ways.
8. for various other proposals for reform, usually less radical, see carpenter (2007), 
feeley (2007b), hyman (2007), Marlow and tolich (2015), Stark (2007), and van den 
hoonaard and hamilton (2016).
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